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Compatibility in Tax Reporting
Vilen Lipatovy
Abstract
We consider corporate tax evasion when business partners have di¤erent
attitudes towards aggressive tax accounting. There are costs of uncoordinated
tax reports, both in terms of catching inspectors attention and running ac-
counts. If these costs are small, there exist a unique stable Nash equilibrium of
the game between the tax authority and a population of heterogeneous rms.
In this equilibrium, the relation between compatibility costs and compliance is
non-monotonic and depends on the curvature of auditing function. However,
compatibility costs reduce non-compliance in low cheating regimes and may
enhance it when many rms are cheating. This provides one rationale for de-
veloping countries to be cautious with employing rened auditing schemes and
for developed countries to promote complicated accounting procedures.
JEL Classication: H26, H32
Keywords: tax evasion, compatibility, coordination, business partners, tax ac-
counting
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a surge in research on tax evasion of rms. The interest was
aroused by an observation that rm adds new dimensions to the problem over and
above standard gambling and cat-and-mouse1 approaches. Firstly, a rm is not a
I am grateful to Chaim Fershtman, Massimo Motta, Rick van der Ploeg, Karl Schlag and par-
ticipants of workshops at European University Institute, Tinbergen Institute, Hannover University;
Labsi and Ruhr Graduate School Conferences for the comments on an earlier version of this paper
entitled "Tax Evasion and Coordination".
yFrankfurt University, Grüneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
1The term is borrowed from Cowell (2006) and refers to the modeling of evasion as a game
between tax agency and a single taxpayer.
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single decision maker and has its own agency problem, as stressed by Crocker and
Slemrod (2005). Second, the interaction between rms can be important for the
general outcome, as Bayer and Cowell (2009) and Sanchez (2006) point out, although
Lipatov (2008) shows that the interaction matters in games with individual taxpayers
as well.
Even in the simplest cases successful hiding of information from tax authority re-
quires coordinated action of at least two parties. In sophisticated evasion (tax evasion
that requires certain expertise and involves intricate manipulation of accounts), there
may be multiple parties as well as substantial costs of making accounts consistent
and looking good at supercial checks of tax authorities. In the US, Sarbanes-Oxley
act of 20022 has made these costs even higher3.
The act is largely seen as a response to corporate scandals which were undermining
condence in the American securities market. The congress has designed it to promote
transparency: increased disclosure becomes mandatory, corporations are required to
install new board oversight and internal controls, investors are promised to be given
better information. In 2003 companies shelled out an average of $16 million on Sarbox
compliance, up 77 percent from the year before. An article in the Economist 2004
devoted to the controversy of this act was entitled 404 tons of paper referring to
the aspect of compatibility costs that are in the spotlight of our paper.
The other aspect of costs to coordinate are di¤erences in the tax reports that
should be similar a priory. In case of business partners, the tax authority observes
transactions and can audit both partners, having some idea of how correlated their
incomes are. It is well known in the profession that the tax audits are not random.
First, the taxpayers are divided in homogenous auditing classes. Second, within each
class the tax authority may receive some signals that a given report is suspicious. One
of such signals is a discrepancy in the reports of business partners. The importance
of coordination in tax reporting is also conrmed experimentally by Alm and McKee
(2004).
The counter-checking of reports is a standard procedure for some taxes. For VAT,
this particularly makes sense, as a part of the tax that is paid by one party is then
rebated by the other. Das-Gupta and Gang (2001) model the matching of purchase
and sales invoices explicitly. They conclude that cross-matching can induce truthful
2The following information about the act is taken from http://www.fmsinc.org/cms/?pid=3253
3The data availability requirements that are also part of costs can be checked at
http://www.itcinstitute.com/display.aspx?id=2021
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reporting, but distorts purchase and sales decisions. In Russia the auditing of one
rm involves checking accounts of the rms that are transacting with it, as described
e. g. in Sumina (2006).
McIntyre (2005) writes that most of the modern sheltering schemes undermine
the basic principle of tax law: a tax deductible item of one taxpayer is a part of
taxable income of the other. The evasion opportunity arises when one rm deducts
some payments made to the other rm, but this other rm is not taxable, e. g. it
is an o¤-shore company. This kind of evasion looks simple in principle, but requires
sophisticated organization and coordination not to be obvious. In turn, the detection
of such evasion requires counter-checking of the reports provided by business partners.
In Russia, the mechanism of evasion is similar, though the schemes are usually blunter:
the accounting specialists register a lot of ctitious rms some of which just do not
pay taxes and disappear.
We look here at a long run situation in an economy where rms exercise trans-
actions with each other. Before entering the industry, a rm has to decide whether
to adopt aggressive attitude towards tax reporting or to stay on the compliant side.
This choice of accounting standard is analogous to the choice of a computer operating
system in its compatibility aspect. That is, while operating together, the rms with
di¤erent accounting machineries incur higher transaction costs than the rms with
similar accounting procedures do.
If a rm decides to be aggressive, it hires a tax evasion specialist who arranges
accounts for a certain fee4. A compliant rm manages accounts itself. After the
accounting policy has been adopted, the rms start operating and transacting with
other rms. Finally, the rms get prots and report them to a tax authority. The
tax authority observes the transacting rms and decides on the auditing intensity.
Thus, in our economy the rms face two kinds of costs in addition to standard costs
and benets of evasion. The rst type is compatibility costs, which have to be borne
every time there is a transaction between rms with di¤erent accounting standards.
These are related to the adjustment of accounts for di¤erent kinds of rms: e. g., the
aggressive and complying rms often prefer transactions to be reected in the books
at di¤erent time points or at di¤erent locations5. The second type is endogenous
costs, which arise every time the tax authority sets unequal probability of auditing
4We treat the specialist as a passive player here. Her optimization problem is analysed in Lipatov
(2008).
5A list of common tax shelters can be found at http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/offon/usa_new/usashelt.html
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for the cases of observing similar and di¤erent reports of the two rms whose income
is known to be correlated.
The endogenous costs are also present in Sanchez (2006). The di¤erence of his
paper from our approach is not only in the lack of compatibility costs, but also
that he considers tax authority with ability to commit. This is well explained by
di¤erent ideas underlying the two papers: whereas we consider long-run equilibrium,
Sanchez concentrates on the short-term with the aim of constructing auditing rule
that minimizes mistakes of the tax authority (in sense of auditing the honest and
not auditing cheaters). Furthermore, whereas Sanchez describes the situation in a
homogenous auditing class, assuming perfect correlation of income and uncertainty
about the auditing rule, we consider a pair of rms with imperfectly correlated income.
The paper by Bayer and Cowell (2009) stands even further from us: it looks at
the e¤ect of auditing on joint decision of competing rms to evade and to produce.
Though their main result, the desirability of non-xed auditing rule, survives in our
setup, we consider rms that are partners rather than competitors, and we focus on
the e¤ect of compatibility costs rather than auditing rules. Crocker and Slemrod
(2005) go inside a rm, whereas we treat it as a decision making unit.
In our model, the tax authority has no ability to commit. Firstly, this has a
natural appeal for the long run modeling. Secondly, though the auditing rules are
often announced by the tax authorities, there is no means to establish whether they
are actually followed.
The main result of the paper is equilibrium characterization: We nd out that
equilibrium cheating and auditing di¤er substantially from the approach disregarding
transactions among the rms, even if the compatibility costs are small. When evasion
is small, the share of cheating rms as well as the auditing probability is likely to be
overestimated, if the coordination of tax reports is not taken into account. In case of
popular misreporting, both the share of non-compliers and the auditing probability
may be underestimated. It is worth noting that the auditing probability in our
setting varies with the reports combination, making comparison with uniform auditing
probability of the representative case di¢ cult in principle.
In general, we idenify three e¤ects that a change in evasion share has on attractive-
ness of aggressive accounting: positive di¤erential probabilityand savinge¤ects
and negative auditing changee¤ect. The positive e¤ects reect benets from be-
ing compatible with more of the potential partners; the negative e¤ect comes from
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strategic reaction of the tax authority. The total e¤ect of any parameter on the
endogenous variables is then inuenced by the sum of the three e¤ects identied.
For a large class of auditing technologies, we nd that compatibility costs decrease
cheating and auditing when only few rms are underreporting and increase them in
case evasion is popular. The correlation of prots has a similar e¤ect. In both
instances, with coordination cost ascent the more popular strategy becomes more
attractive; hence more rms choose it in equilibrium. Somewhat surprisingly, but
following exactly the same logic, improvement in auditing technology and nes reduce
cheating in low evasion regimes and enhance it in high evasion regimes.
The auditing probability in our model can be positively a¤ected by the amount of
nes, unlike in representative case. This becomes possible because the direct e¤ect of
larger nes to make auditing more attractive may overplay the indirect e¤ect coming
through the reduced cheating. Finally, the e¤ectiveness of ne always decreases as a
result of an increase in compatibility costs.
We also shed some light on the mechanism of evasion game when compatibility
matters: we show that correlation of prots solely generates the di¤erence in auditing
probabilities. The compatibility costs alone change equilibrium cheating and auditing,
but leave the latter independent from the report conguration.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model setup is presented in
the next section, followed by the description of equilibrium structure. Section four is
devoted to the discussion of the results for the mixed equilibrium. Section ve looks
at an example of particular auditing technology. Conclusion is followed by appendix
with derivations of equilibria and results.
2 Evasion game
2.1 Single rm benchmark
Let us start with the case when there are no transacting pairs and no compatibility
costs. A single rm decides whether to evade its prot, facing the tax authority that
can perform auditing. We use the approach of Graez, Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
in this benchmark, with a convex rather than linear cost function for auditing.
First, the nature moves, assigning a type to the rms: high prot h =  or low
prot l = 0. The types are drawn from a distribution characterized by a density
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function
f (x) =
(
 if x = 
1   if x = 0 :
Second, the high prot rms decide whether to submit a high report H =  (be
honest) or a low report L = 0 (cheat).
The tax authority does not audit high reports and exerts e¤ort a in auditing
low reports. A continuous function a : [0; 1) ! R+ is a mapping from detection
probability dened on the unit interval to the auditing e¤ort dened for non-negative
real numbers. The inverse function determines detection probability from the e¤ort
p : R+ ! [0; 1). We assume that the rms can never be detected with certainty, and
zero e¤ort results in zero detection probability p (0) = 0. The low report is honest
with probability 1 
1 +q and not with the complementary probability, where q is the
probability that high prot rm is cheating.
The authority is maximizing its expected revenue q
1 +qp (a) (1 + s) t   a, the
high income rm - its expected prot    p (a) (1 + s) t. Here s is a surcharge rate
for being caught, t is a tax rate. In equilibrium with positive detection probability
FOC for the tax authority p0 (a) (1 + s) t = 1 
q + 1, and indi¤erent condition for
the rm is . Hence equilibrium e¤ort is
p (a) =
1
1 + s
and equilibrium evasion probability is
q =
1  

1
p0
 
p 1
 
1
1+s

(1 + s) t   1 :
Su¢ cient conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium: p is strictly increas-
ing and strictly concave, p0
 
p 1
 
1
1+s

> 1
(1+s)t
. The latter actually ensures mixed
equilibrium. If, to the contrary, detection probability does not increase fast enough or
the ne is too small, the equilibrium is all cheating. The equilibrium, either in mixed
or pure strategies, is unique with strictly increasing and strictly convex p. We retain
this assumption for the rest of the paper. The mixed equilibrium is of most interest
to us, since we do not observe full cheating and the nes are usually high enough
to cover auditing costs in reality. Moreover, this mixed equilibrium is evolutionary
stable (Weibull 1995), as even if a small part of taxpayers gives honest reports, the
reduction in detection probability is not enough to o¤-set a loss from lower evasion.
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2.2 Two transacting rms
Recall the story behind our model, presented in the introduction. Firstly, the rms
choose their accounting standards. Second, the rms are matched according to some
rule. Third, the rms draw pre-tax incomes from participating in a match. The
second and third stages may repeat a number of times. Fourth, the rms summarize
the realized income and submit a tax report. Finally, the tax authority audits the
tax reports of some rms (and all its partners).
To make the analysis as simple as possible while preserving the coordination as-
pect, we make the following simplifying assumptions: (i) each rm meets only one
transacting partner; (ii) each rm makes only one transaction; (iii) the aggressive rm
does not report truthfully. Under these assumptions the game above is equivalent to
the following 3 player game.
2.2.1 The setup
Consider a simultaneous game between two risk neutral rms and a tax authority.
The rst move is made by the rms. They decide whether to adopt aggressive
accounting policy and pay a price b per evaded euro for it, 0  b < t, or to use
compliant accounting that comes at a cost normalized to zero.
The second move is made by the nature that assigns a type to each of the two
rms: high prot h =  or low prot l = 0. We assume now that the prots are
correlated with the correlation coe¢ cient r; 0  r < 16. We do not consider negative
correlation, as our rms are cooperating rather than competing. The joint distribution
of two types in a match is given by the following density function:
f (x; y) =
8>><>>:
; if x = y = ;
   ; if fx; yg = f0; g ;
1  2 + ; if x = y = 0:
where  := 2 +  (1  ) r;  2 [2; ).
After the pre-tax prot is realized, the rms submit their reports according to
the procedure they chose in the rst stage. Namely, the low income rm submits a
6We have also analyzed the case when r = 1, but since this is not likely to happen in reality, we
do not present the results here. It turns out that the equilibrium structure in this case is distinctly
di¤erent from correlation arbitrary close to perfect, so we also cannot use it as a benchmark. The
derivation of equilibrium is available upon request.
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low report and gets a payo¤ normalized to 0, if its partner has the same accounting
standard, and  c, if it has a di¤erent standard. The high income rm submits a high
report H =  (be honest) if chose compliant policy or a low report L = 0 (cheat) if
chose aggressive policy. Each rm of type h (high prot) gets ex interim expected
payo¤ (before the coordination costs c) of u (i; j), where i is its own report and j is
a report of its partner:
u (L;L) =    p  aLL (1 + s) t   b;
u (L;H) =    p  aHL (1 + s) t   b;
u (H;H) = u (H;L) =  (1  t) :
Ex ante expected prot is then the following. If a rm decides to use aggressive
accounting,
u (A) =  (qu (L;L) + (1  q)u (L;H)) + (   )u (L;L) + (1  )  0  (1  q) c:
Here the event when both the rm and its partner get high prot denes the rst
term, the event when the rm gets high prot and its partner gets a low one denes
the second term. The third term contains the payo¤ in the event of our rm getting
low prot, normalized to zero. In any event we have to subtract coordination cost c
in case our aggressive rm is matched with the compliant one, and that is what the
last term takes care of.
If a rm decides to use compliant accounting, it is
u (C) =  (qu (H;L) + (1  q)u (H;H)) + (   )u (H;L) + (1  )  0  qc:
The terms are similar: both rms getting high prot, only the compliant rm getting
high prot, and the compliant rm getting low prot.
The third move is by the tax authority, which chooses an auditing e¤ort a 2 R+
conditional on the reports observed: a (LL) (two low reports), a (HL) (a low and a
high report in any order), a (HH) (two high reports). The tax authority gets expected
revenue of p (a) (1 + s) t a from each cheater it audits and the revenue t a from
each honest report it audits.
The game takes into account both types of costs outlined in the introduction.
Compatibility costs are xed to c per transaction. The endogenous coordination
cost reects the di¤erence in detection probabilities the tax authority might want
to generate. Namely, the authority can exert di¤erent e¤orts in auditing low prot
report depending on whether it comes with another low report or with a high report.
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Compared to the case of two low reports, it needs a half of resources to provide the
same auditing probability if one of the reports is high. Thus, we do not consider the
case in which coordinated evasion requires more e¤ort to discover than uncoordinated
does.
We choose the simultaneous formulation rather than a sequential one, because
we do not want to consider a particular industry structure or a relation between
an entrant and an incumbent. Our goal is to characterize the economy where two
rms from di¤erent populations (again, think of buyers and sellers) meet to play a
coordination game. Even more, since the decisions are long-term, they become a
property of the rms, so that they can be characterized as evaders or honest. In this
way, the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous game show us where these populations
could converge to.
2.2.2 Optimization problem of the tax authority
The tax authority observes the match. Recall that we denote with lower-case letters
the prots, and with upper-case the reports. We have then the following prot -
report table
total HH HL LL
hh   (1  q)2 2q (1  q) q2
hl 2 (   ) 0 2 (   ) (1  q) 2q (   )
ll 1  2 +  0 0 1  2 + 
which represents the measures (or shares) of taxpayer pairs reporting incomes given
by the column entries, while actually receiving incomes given by row entries.
The following lemma characterizes the best response of the tax authority in this
case.
Lemma 1 In the tax evasion game above the best response of the tax authority a (q)
to the rms cheating with probability q 2 (0; 1] is implicitly dened by:
aHH = 0; (1)
p0
 
aHL (q)

=
q +    
q (1 + s) t
; if q  q0HL; (2)
p0
 
aLL (q)

=
q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
(q2 + q (   )) (1 + s) t ; if q  q
0
LL; (3)
aHL (q) = 0; if q < q0HL; a
LL (q) = 0; if q < q0LL: (4)
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The proof is left to the appendix A, q0HL and q
0
LL are also dened there. Obviously,
observing two high reports the tax authority does not audit them. Observing di¤erent
reports in a match, the authority audits the low one with probability determined by
the e¤ort aHL (q). When two low reports are observed, the optimal auditing e¤ort is
given by aHL (q).
Note that the two e¤orts (and corresponding probabilities) are only equal, when
r = 0, that is the report of one rm does not contain any information about the prot
of the other rm. With r > 0 we have aHL (q)  aLL (q), which is quite intuitive:
di¤erent reports indicate possible cheating, so it makes sense to audit them more.
2.2.3 Equilibria
Before stating the result it is useful to introduce the following terminology:
Denition 1 We call an equilibrium of our game full cheating, if all the rms are
submitting low (zero) reports in this equilibrium q = 1; we call an equilibrium
full honesty, if all the high income rms submit high reports q = 0.
The proposition 1 characterizes the equilibria arising in case of correlated draws.
We denote the equilibrium values of cheating probability with q and of auditing e¤ort
with a.
Proposition 1 In the tax evasion game with two transacting rms
(i) There exists a symmetric evolutionary stable equilibrium with q implicitly
dened by
 (t  b) (1  2q) c =  (    (1  q)) p  aLL (q)+  (1  q) p  aHL (q) (1 + s) t;
(5)
aHH = 0, aHL = aHL (q), aLL = aLL (q) as given by (1), if the compatibility
costs are small and
 (t  b)    1  2q0LL c >   1  q0LL p  aHL  q0LL (1 + s) t; (6)
where q0LL reects auditing technology and is dened in the appendix.
(ii) There exists a symmetric evolutionary stable equilibrium with q implicitly
dened by
 (t  b)   (1  2q) c =  (1  q) p  aHL (q) (1 + s) t; (7)
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aHH = 0, aHL = aHL (q), aLL = 0, if the compatibility costs are small and
(6) does not hold7.
(iii) If  (t  b)   c  0, there exist a full honesty equilibrium with q =
0; a  0.
(iv) If  (t  b) + c  p  aLL (1) (1 + s) t, there exist a full cheating equi-
librium, and q = 1; aHH = 0, aHL = aHL (1), aLL = aLL (1).
The proof of the proposition is left to appendix B. The structure of equilibria is
very intuitive: for small compatibility costs (how small they should be depends on
the auditing technology) there is a unique stable mixed equilibrium, as in a standard
game without coordination issues. A small qualication here is that it takes a di¤erent
form depending on whether consistent low reports are audited (i) or not (ii).
With larger compatibility costs, multiple equilibria may arise. More importantly,
full honesty and full cheating may become equilibrium, as with everybody around
being honest it is too costly in terms of compatibility to use aggressive accounting
and visa versa. Whereas only the magnitude of the compatibility costs (relative to
the evasion benets) decides whether there exist full honesty equilibrium (iii), the
auditing technology also plays a role in determining the existence of full cheating
equilibrium (iv).
3 Discussion of the results
3.1 Summary
Since we believe that the exogenous coordination costs are relatively small, we can
concentrate on the regions of parameter values where a mixed equilibrium exists. As
it has been already noted, the probability of auditing for dissonant reports is higher
than that for the similar reports as long as r > 0. A further breakdown of the
compatibility costs propagation mechanism is represented in the table below:
c = 0; r = 0 c > 0; r = 0 c = 0; r > 0
p (LL) t b
(1+s)t
p

p0 1

q+1 
q(1+s)t

p

p0 1

q2+2q( )+1 2+
(q2+q( ))(1+s)t

p (HL) t b
(1+s)t
p

p0 1

q+1 
q(1+s)t

t b
(1+s)t
7The equilibria characterized in (i) and (ii) are also unique under the conditions specied in the
appendix B.
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From this table we see clearly that the di¤erential auditing probability is generated
from some correlation even in the absence of exogenous compatibility costs. On the
other hand, only exogenous costs c shift equilibrium cheating probability even in the
absence of auditing intensity di¤erential: The following expression determines the
share of aggressive rms with independent draws.
 (t  b)   (1  2q) c = p

p0 1

q + 1  
q (1 + s) t

(1 + s) t: (8)
Thus, the two channels of the compatibility costs can be clearly separated.
The following remark shows how the expected payo¤ of the rms I depend on the
compatibility costs. The payo¤ is easy to compute because in the mixed equilibrium
the rms a ex ante indi¤erent between aggressive and compliant accounting.
Remark Compatibility costs put a burden on the rms unless there is a full honesty:
I =  (1  t)   qc.
3.2 Comparative statics
Firstly, we are interested in how the equilibrium value of cheating depends on the
compatibility costs. For q > q0LL, from (5) we have
(1  2q) dc = Qdq; (9)
Q :=
 

 
p
 
aHL
  p  aLL  (    (1  q)) p0  aLL aLLq
  (1  q) p0  aHL aHLq
!
(1 + s) t + 2c:
(10)
On the lhs we see the direct e¤ect of c on the costs of evasion: When there are more
compliant rms (q < 1=2), the e¤ect is positive, as there is a higher chance to meet
a compliant rm and incur the compatibility costs. Otherwise (q > 1=2), the e¤ect
is negative, as there is a higher chance to meet a rm with aggressive accounting.
On the rhs we see the indirect e¤ect of c on the benets of evasion through
changing q. The e¤ect is more intricate and can be divided into three terms. The
rst term is a positive di¤erential in auditing probability for similar and di¤erent
reports. Indeed, with higher q there is a lower chance to submit di¤erent reports,
so the evading rms can enjoy lower auditing probability (di¤erential probability
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e¤ect). The second term reects the negative e¤ect of q on the attractiveness of
evasion through raising auditing probability for both types of the reports (auditing
changee¤ect). The third term is positive and reects the increase in benets from
evasion through saving on compatibility costs (savinge¤ect).
Thus, the total indirect e¤ect is ambiguous. Note that this is true not only for
compatibility costs, but for any parameter a¤ecting q, since it is actually change in
q itself that either increases or decreases attractiveness of evasion depending on how
responsive the auditing probability is. This in turn depends on the curvature of the
auditing function (we see p0 (a) directly in (9), in appendix we show that aq depends
on p00 (a)). As p0 (a) is decreasing in q with @2p0 (a (q)) = (@a@q) < 0, the e¤ect of
the auditing change is most likely to outweight other e¤ects for small q, and visa
versa. Because of strict monotonicity and p (+1)  1, auditing functions satisfy
p0 (+1) = 0. So, the auditing change e¤ect evaporates for large q, and the total
e¤ect becomes positive.
For the class of functions with p0 (0) = +1, q0LL = q0HL = 0 and the auditing
change e¤ect grows unboundedly large at zero, whereas the lhs is bounded, so the
total e¤ect is certainly negative. Thus, for such functions there is a threshold value
of equilibrium share of cheaters qc, below which the total indirect e¤ect is negative
(and hence dq=dc < 0 for q < min f1=2; qcg), and above which the total indirect
e¤ect is positive (and hence dq=dc < 0 for q > max f1=2; qcg).
We also note that the di¤erential probability e¤ect is reinforced by prot correla-
tion more than the auditing change e¤ect, so the total is more likely to be negative
with lower correlation. At the extreme of independent draws we shall have
Q =  p0 (a) aq (1 + s) t + 2c;
which is negative, if compatibility costs are small.8
If the equilibrium is at the intersection when only inconsistent reports are audited,
that is q0HL < q
 < q0LL, we have
(1  2q) dc = Q0dq (11)
Q0 :=
  
p
 
aHL
   (1  q) p0  aHL aHLq   (1 + s) t + 2c
We can see the play of all e¤ects described above also here. The di¤erential
probability is represented by p
 
aHL

and the auditing change e¤ect is weakened,
8For su¢ ciently large compatibility costs the total e¤ect is positive, but this is most likely to be
irrelevant, as we are not sure about existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium under consideration.
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because the similar reports are not audited. We know that close to q0HL the total
e¤ect is negative, as p
 
aHL (q0HL)

= 0. With higher q the di¤erential probability
e¤ect kicks in and the auditing change e¤ect is less pronounced, so that the total may
even change its sign.
Second, we are interested in the e¤ect of correlation on the equilibrium share of
rms that use aggressive accounting. For an equilibrium with non-zero auditing of
both report combinations9, we have
Dd = Qdq; (12)
D :=
  
(    (1  q)) p0  aLL aLL +  (1  q) p0  aHL aHL 
+
 
p
 
aHL
  p  aLL (1  q)
!
(1 + s) t (13)
The direct e¤ect of the correlation on the costs of evasion is always positive (the
last term in D). It increases in the probability di¤erential and the share of compliant
rms. Intuitively, with higher correlation di¤erent reports are more likely, other things
being equal. And since di¤erent reports are more likely to be detected and punished
than similar, expected ne increases in prot correlation. The indirect e¤ect of the
correlation through auditing probability is represented by the rst two terms in the
expression for D. The rst term is a negative e¤ect through the decrease in auditing
of similar reports (aLL < 0), the second term is a positive e¤ect through the increase
in auditing of di¤erent reports (aHL > 0).
Here we can observe that for small q the negative e¤ect becomes small, whereas
for large q the positive e¤ects vanish. The total e¤ect of correlation on q depends then
on the indirect e¤ect discussed at length above. For example, for auditing functions
satisfying Inada conditions dq=dr < 0 for both very small and very large q.
Third, we would like to see how an improvement in auditing technology a¤ects
the equilibrium. Consider a new auditing technology p1 (a) = kp (a) ; k > 0. Then
Kdk = Q1dq; (14)
K :=
 
(    (1  q))  p  aLL (q)+ kp0  aLL aLLk 
+(1  q) p  aHL (q) + kp0  aHL aHLk 
!
(1 + s) t: (15)
where Q1 is a correspondingly adjusted version of Q that takes into account k. As
expected, the direct e¤ect of an improvement in auditing on the costs of evasion is
positive: the same e¤ort of the tax authority results in higher expected ne for a rm.
9The sign of the expression does not change if only high-low report combinations are audited.
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The indirect e¤ect is negative: with more e¤ective auditing the optimal auditing e¤ort
is reduced, so the expected ne goes down as well. The total e¤ect K depends on
the size of p00 (a): If p (k) is concave, the direct e¤ect is higher than the indirect one,
so the total e¤ect of an improvement in auditing on the evasion costs is positive; the
opposite is true for convex p (k).
The e¤ect through equilibrium cheating Q1 is not a¤ected much, as both di¤eren-
tial probability and auditing change e¤ects are amplied to the same extent, only the
compatibility e¤ect becomes relatively less important. Then with Inada conditions
and positive K, dq=dk < 0 for q < qc, dq=dk > 0 for q > qc, that is improvement
in auditing technology reduces cheating in low evasion regimes and enhances it in
high evasion regimes.
Fourth, we look at the ne. In our model the cheating is not necessarily decreasing
in the surcharge rate s. The deterrence e¤ect depends again on whether an increase
in q curbs or boosts benets of evasion, i.e. on the sign of Q: 
(    (1  q)) p  aLL (q)+  (1  q) p  aHL (q) tds = Qdq: (16)
With Inada conditions that means dq=ds < 0 for q < qc, dq=ds > 0 for q > qc.
We dene the measure of e¤ectiveness of the ne as the absolute value of the
derivative of the equilibrium cheating
dq
ds
. We immediately see that this mea-
sure is decreasing in compatibility costs, so the nes loosen their grip with higher
costs in our equilibrium. This is important to have in mind while formulating a
tax/enforcement/accounting policy.
4 Example
We take a function a (p) =  k ln(1   p) from Reinganum and Wilde (1986). The
inverse function is p (a) = 1   e  ak . k is a detection di¢ culty parameter: the higher
it is, the more e¤ort is required to support a given detection probability.
From Lemma 1, using the functional form for the auditing technology, we can
write
aHL (q) =  k ln

k
q +    
q (1 + s) t

; q > q0HL; (17)
aLL (q) =  k ln

k
q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
(q2 + q (   )) (1 + s) t

; q > q0LL: (18)
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The two thresholds are
q0HL =
=   1
(1 + s) t   1 ;
q0LL =
  (   ) ((1 + s) t   2) +
q
(   ) ((1 + s) t   2)2 + 4 ((1 + s) t   1)  (1  2 + )
2 ((1 + s) t   1)  ;
assuming (1 + s) t > 2.
From Proposition 1 we have
 (t  b)   (1  2q) c =   (    (1  q)) k

   
q

(19)
 1  q

q
k

q + 1  
q +       1

+  ((1 + s) t   k) : (20)
This is a third degree polynomial, so we have to solve it numerically. For the com-
plementary case
 (t  b)   (1  2q) c =  (1  q)

(1 + s) t   k

1 +
   
q

;
Full cheating condition is c+k >  (b+ st), full honesty condition is  (t  b) <
c.
4.1 Parameterization
In the following we calibrate our parameters to the values common in the literature.
We want to see how at plausible parameter values the compatibility costs a¤ect equi-
librium cheating and auditing quantitatively. To do this, we shall rstly explain the
choice of parameters. Secondly, we dene two benchmarks according to how wide-
spread evasion is: popular cheating (q = 0:6) featuring developing countries and rare
cheating (q = 0:2) characterizing developed world. Finally, we look at how the cheat-
ing and auditing probabilities as well as tax revenue are changing for each of the
benchmarks.
Since the literature before us did not consider compatibility costs explicitly, we
leave them free. We take the values of most parameters directly from Lipatov (2008),
as we follow the same logic there: s = 0:8; t = 0:3;  = 0:5. Fixing correlation at
r = 0:5, that gives us  = 0:375. Choice of  is arbitrary, as it is not unit-free. We
normalize it to  = 10 to ensure that (1 + s) t > max f2; =g is satised and lower
threshold is in interior.
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With these parameter values our thresholds are
q0HL = 0:075758;
q0LL = 0:47118
We see that for low evasion regime q0HL < q
 < q0LL, for high evasion regime q
 > q0LL.
We x b = 0:03 in high evasion equilibrium to feature the widespread Russian
3% rule for the evasion service and (somewhat arbitrarily) b = 0:2 in low evasion
equilibrium.
4.2 Low evasion regime
For the low evasion regime we can calibrate auditing e¤ectiveness as
k =
( 10 (b  t) + 10t (q   1) (s+ 1))


1
q
(   ) + 1

(q   1)
= 1:4
and we have c < 0:5 as a condition for non-existence of full cheating or full honesty
equilibria.
Share of rms with aggressive accounting
Fixing the parameters, we get the following picture:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.10
0.15
0.20
c
q
Figure 1. The e¤ect of compatibility cost c on
evasion share q, low evasion regime.
On the horizontal axis we can see here compatibility costs c. The vertical axis shows
the share of cheating rms in the unique symmetric equilibrium. An increase in
compatibility costs from zero to 0:5 (5% of high prot) causes 35% decrease in cheating
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share (from 20% to about 13%). We see that the costs have a substantial disciplining
e¤ect on tax reporting in low cheating regime.
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
r
q
Figure 2. The e¤ect of prot correlation r on evasion
share q, low evasion regime, c = 0:1.
From rgure 2 we can see that correlation has a similar e¤ect on the equilibrium share
of cheating. An increase in correlation from 40% to 60% drives cheating down from
28% to 13%.
Auditing probability
The auditing probability (only di¤erent reports are audited) is plotted on the
gure 3:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
c
pHL
Figure 3. The e¤ect of compatibility cost c on
auditing probability pHL, low evasion regime.
The probability is a decreasing function of the costs, which is no surprise, as it is a
decreasing function of the share of cheaters. More interesting is the extent of this
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e¤ect: an increase in compatibility costs from zero to 0:5 causes auditing probability
to drop from above 30% to less than 10%). This is a very substantial e¤ect, so the
cost savings associated with decreased auditing could be used to nance introduction
of higher compatibility costs.
The e¤ect of prot correlation on auditing probability is also positive in our pa-
rameterization. In general, from Lemma 1 we know that @pHL=@r > 0, and since
dpHL=dq > 0 and from gure 2 dq=dr < 0, we have an ambiguous sign for dpHL=dr.
For our example, the direct e¤ect outweighs the one through the compliance, so the
total e¤ect is positive.
Tax revenue
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1.20
1.22
1.24
1.26
1.28
1.30
1.32
c
R
Figure 4. The e¤ect of compatibility cost c on tax
revenue R, low evasion regime.
Finally, from gure 4 we can see that tax revenue is an increasing function of compat-
ibility costs. This is intuitive, as the compatibility costs reduce both non-compliance
and enforcement costs, so the both direct revenues are boosted and the auditing
expenditures are curbed (but the ne collection is also reduced).
4.3 High evasion regime
The simplest calibration for the case of no compatibility costs in high evasion regime
gives
k =
10 (b  t) + 10t (s+ 1)
   1
q


 +q+1
 +q   1

(q   1) + 1
q
( +  (q   1)) (   )
= 1:3289; (21)
and the condition of nonexistence of corner equilibrium is c < 0:2.
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Share of rms with aggressive accounting
For the high evasion regime, we get the following picture:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
c
q
Figure 5. The e¤ect of compatibility cost c on
evasion share q, high evasion regime.
We plot the evasion share also for the values of compatibility costs beyond 0:2, that
is when this equilibrium is not unique any more. The reason is that it is still a unique
stable equilibrium (full cheating and full honesty are not stable). So from gure 5 we
can see that the e¤ect of the costs on the equilibrium share of evasion is positive, but
quantitatively less pronounced than in the low evasion regime. An increase in costs
from 0 to 0:25 leads to 5% increase (from 60% to 63%) in the share of rms with
aggressive accounting.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
r
q
Figure 6. The e¤ect of prot correlation r on
evasion share q, high evasion regime, c = 0:1.
Figure 6 shows that the e¤ect of correlation goes into the opposite direction with
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the e¤ect of the costs. An increase in correlation from 40% to 60% drives cheating
down from around 64% to around 60%.
Auditing probabilities and tax revenues
The e¤ect of compatibility costs on auditing probabilities and tax revenues is
summarized in the following table:
c q pHL pLL R
0 0:6 0:617 19 0:226 57 1: 373 1
0:05 0:60465 0:618 24 0:232 54 1: 362 5
0:1 0:60988 0:619 4 0:239 13 1: 350 6
0:15 0:61582 0:620 7 0:246 46 1: 337
0:2 0:62267 0:622 17 0:254 69 1: 321 4
0:25 0:63071 0:623 85 0:264 08 1: 303
0:3 0:64039 0:625 81 0:275 01 1: 280 8
0:35 0:65244 0:628 18 0:288 06 1: 253 1
0:4 0:6683 0:631 16 0:304 37 1: 216 4
We see that both probabilities increase with an increase in compatibility costs.
Again, the e¤ect is quantitatively small. An increase in costs from 0 to 0:25 leads
to only 0.6 p.p. increase in the auditing probability for di¤erent reports and 3.8 p.p.
increase in the auditing probability for similar reports. The tax revenues decrease,
mirroring the case of low evasion.
Policy
The stylized examples above nicely illustrate di¤erent policies towards compat-
ibility costs appropriate for di¤erent countries. The high evasion costs situation is
more likely in developed countries with low level of evasion. In such cases the e¤orts
to decrease compatibility costs can be dangerous in a sense of bringing about more
cheating and lower tax revenues. The low evasion costs picture is for the countries
with ourishing evasion, like most of developing countries and CIS countries. These
countries should not pay too much attention to compatibility of the accounts, as
increasing the compatibility costs may result in even larger cheating.
From this prospective, the Sorbanes-Oxley act can be justied on the ground
of increasing costs c in the US. At the same time, unwillingness of many developing
countries to be involved in a detailed analysis of industry structures in order to deduce
true tax income can also be rationalized with the help of our model. This is certainly
not to say that there are no more important factors underlying both phenomena, but
simply to show that our model seems to go well with the stylized facts we know.
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5 Conclusion
The tax evasion game with costs of accounting compatibility between contracting
rms is considered in this paper. We show that when compatibility costs are small,
there is a unique stable equilibrium10 with a positive share of evading rms and a
positive share of audited reports. When the costs are large, there may be multiple
equilibria, in some of which either everybody or nobody evades.
The game yields the insights that are impossible to obtain within the represen-
tative rm framework. Firstly, the tax authority should put more e¤ort in auditing
rms that did not coordinate their evasion decision, if it maximizes its expected rev-
enue. Second, the compatibility costs may a¤ect the amount of evasion in the opposite
directions depending on what the auditing technology and the equilibrium share of
cheating are. If there are many non-compliant taxpayers, the compatibility costs are
more likely to increase evasion, and visa versa. The correlation of taxpayer prot
a¤ects equilibrium in a similar way. Third, the e¤ect of the nes and auditing tech-
nology on equilibrium values crucially depends on the prevailing accounting standard.
When most of the rms use an aggressive standard, an increase in nes or auditing
e¤ectiveness may have an adverse e¤ect on compliance.
There is a number of policy recommendations arising from our analysis. Firstly,
compatibility costs reduction e¤orts are only justied for economies (or industries)
with substantial shadow sector. Such e¤orts include simplied accounting (exogenous
costs) and little interest in the business links (endogenous costs through auditing
probability di¤erential). Secondly, the marginal increases in nes may be dangerous in
high evasion economies. Thirdly, compatibility costs enhancement may be a sensible
strategy for low evasion countries, and it may even be nanced by eventual reduction
in enforcement costs.
We hope that our paper opens up a whole tile of issues that could not be addressed
by the literature before. How do the links between taxpayers a¤ect their decision to
pay taxes? How are these links taken into account by the tax authority? Could the
government change the structure of these links for the benet of the whole society?
We cannot answer these questions in a far too simplied setting of business pairs we
have here. However, what we can do is to say that the equilibrium behavior of the
agents is a¤ected signicantly by the links between them, that it is a¤ected through
the costs of behaving di¤erently, and it is a¤ected in the direction of harmonization
10The uniqueness is guaranteed under mild technical assumption presented in the appendix.
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of this behavior.
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Appendices
A - Proof of Lemma 1
The expected revenue of the auditor is
 (1  q)2 t + (   ) (1  q) t + q (1  q) t (22)
+(1 + s) p
 
aHL

q (1  q) t (23)
  (q (1  q) + (   ) (1  q)) aHL
+(1 + s) p
 
aLL
  
q2 + q (   ) t
   q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 +  aLL
Here the rst term is the revenue from the rms that have high prots and do not
evade (they are of measure  (1  q)2). The second group of 3 term is the revenue
from the mixed reports: the high reports bringing t are of measure q (1  q) +
(   ) (1  q), and low reports bringing in the ne are q (1  q). Correspondingly,
the costs of auditing must be subtracted for these cases. Finally, the last terms are
the revenue from low reports and costs of auditing them. The same ne is levied in
the cases of two rms or only one rm misreporting.
Rearranging and taking rst order conditions with respect to aLL and aHL gives
aHL :   (q (1  q) + (   ) (1  q)) + q (1  q) (1 + s) p0  aHL t = 0;
aLL :
 
q2 + q (   ) (1 + s) tp0  aLL   q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 +  = 0:
Working this out, we arrive at
gHL (q) : =
q +    
q (1 + s) t
= p0
 
aHL (q)

;
gLL (q) : =
q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
(q2 + q (   )) (1 + s) t = p
0  aLL (q) ;
where the equality holds for a > 0. In this case we can show that p0
 
aHL (q)

<
p0
 
aLL (q)

, as
gLL (q)  gHL (q) = q
2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
q (q +    ) (1 + s) t  
q +    
q (1 + s) t
=
   2
q (q +    ) (1 + s) t ;
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which is positive for any positive correlation and zero for independent draws. Note
also that the di¤erence is decreasing and convex in q, so @2p0 (a (q)) = (@a@q) < 0,
@3p0 (a (q)) = (@a@q2) > 0.
Under concavity assumption second order conditions are trivially satised and
aHL (q) > aLL (q). Our intuition is conrmed: low reports paired with high reports
are audited more intensively than those paired with low reports.
Note though that because limq!0 gHL (q) = +1, there may also be a corner
solution. Indeed, for any auditing function p (a) : lima!0 p0 (a) < +1 there will be
a corner solution. Formally, for all such functions 9q0HL > 0 : aHL (q) = aLL (q) =
08q  q0HL. By construction it is also true that 9q0LL > q0HL : aHL (q) > aLL (q) =
08q 2 [q0HL; q0LL]. These threshold values can be found from the auditing function.
For the di¤erent reports we have
q0HL =
=   1
p0 (0) (1 + s) t   1 :
For the similar reports the threshold value f the share of rms with aggressive ac-
counting is implicitly dened by
1  2 +  = (p0 (0) (1 + s) t   1)   q0LL2 + q0LL (   ) ((1 + s) t   2) :
Since 0  q0HL  1, if p0 (0) < 1= ((1 + s) t), tax authority will never audit, as the
marginal revenue from audit is negative. Furthermore, if p0 (0) < = ( (1 + s) t), the
best response function is degenerate with a (q)  0; if p0 (0) < 1 + 1= ( (1 + s) t) 
=, the similar reports are never audited: aLL (q)  0.
Thus, both best responses (for mixed and similar reports) of the tax autority are
weakly increasing continuous functions of q.
B - Proof of proposition 2
To show that p; q is indeed a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need 1) p is a best
response of tax authority given the belief about q; 2) each rm plays best response to
p and the share of cheating rms q; 3) the belief of the authority is consistent with
equilibrium play of the rms.
For 1) we need (??) and (1); for 2) in a mixed equilibrium it is su¢ cient that each
rm is indi¤erent between cheating and honesty given that the partner is cheating
with probability q:
u (A) = u (C)
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or
 (qu (L;L) + (1  q)u (L;H)) + (   )u (L;L)  (1  q) c =
 (qu (H;L) + (1  q)u (H;H)) + (   )u (H;L)  qc
Rearranging, we get
 (t  b) (1  2q) c =  (    (1  q)) p  aLL+  (1  q) p  aHL (1 + s) t: (24)
Note that this expression depends on q unlike in the benchmark case, so we cannot
present the resulting equilibrium explicitly. However, the two sides of the equation
admit quite a straightforward intuitive explanation. The lhs is the benet from eva-
sion net of accounting costs b and coordination costs c. The rhs is the expected cost of
nes in two types of matches: two low reports and high-low reports. Both costs and
benets of evasion increase with q. The higher population share of evaders relieves
the coordination problem for a rm that chose aggressive accounting. At the same
time, higher share of wrong reports calls for more auditing thus increasing expected
ne.
Formally, from the properties of best response functions aLL (q) ; aHL (q) we can see
that rhs of (24) is weakly monotonically increasing in q. Namely, it is zero for q  q0HL,
it is  (1  q) p  aHL (q) (1 + s) t for q 2 [q0HL; q0LL], and it is the full expression for
q  q0LL converging to
 
(    (1  q)) p  aLL (1 + s) t as q approaches unity. We
know that p0a (q) is convex (we can directly compute second derivatives). We also know
that p (p0a) is decreasing, but we did not impose anything on its convexity/concavity.
Now, p (q) can be written as p (p0a (q)). It is increasing, and it is also concave if p (p
0
a) is
not too convex. Thus, rhs is concave under a mild ansumption on the third derivative
of the function p (a).
At q0LL, the left derivative of rhs is

(1  q0LL) pq
 
aHL (q0LL)
  p  aHL (q0LL)  (1 + s) t,
the right derivative has an additional term

(    (1  q0LL)) pq
 
aLL (q0LL)

+ p
 
aLL (q0LL)

(1 + s) t,
which is positive.
Lhs is linearly increasing in q with the slope 2c, starting with  (t  b)  c. The
intersection(s) dene Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Because of a jump in the deriv-
ative of rhs at q0LL, we may have up to 6 intersections (with up to 3 locally stable
equilibria). However, the more interesting case for us is the stable unique equilib-
rium, which indeed results for small values of c, if either (1  q0LL) pq
 
aHL (q0LL)
  
p
 
aHL (q0LL)
  0 or  (t  b)    (1  q0LL) p  aHL (q0LL) (1 + s) t or  (t  b) 
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(1 + s) tmaxq2[q0HL;q0LL]
 
 (1  q) p  aHL (q). At the limit of no coordination costs,
the equilibrium is dened by one of the conditions  (1  b=t) =  (    (1  q)) p  aLL+  (1  q) p  aHL (1 + s)
or  (1  b=t) =  (1  q) p  aHL (1 + s), depending on the auditing technology. Namely,
the rst happens, if  (t  b)   (1  2q0LL) c >  (1  q0LL) p
 
aHL (q0LL)

(1 + s) t,
and the second otherwise.
This equilibrium is unique and stable. By continuity, the same is true for small
values of c.
Note that with increase of c lhs simply rotates around horizontal line given by
 (t  b). It retains this value at q = 0:5, while going down by c at q = 0 and up by
c at q = 1. This immediately leads us to the following corollary:
Corollary With q = 1=2, the e¤ect of coordination costs is completely neutralized.
This is very intuitive: when the two populations are balanced, there is neither
potential gain nor loss in terms of coordination from playing either strategy.
Note that the equilibrium will only be stable, if at the intersection the slope of
the evasion costs (rhs) exceeds the slope of the benets from evasion (lhs). Thus,
stability requires the following condition to be satised:
2c <
 
(1  q) pq
 
aHL (q)
  p  aHL (q)  + (    (1  q)) pq  aLL (q)+ p  aLL (q) (1 + s) t;
where q is the equilibrium share of the rms that employ aggressive accounting.
If there is no stable interior equilibrium, the full cheating is stable. A general
condition for existence of full cheating equilibrium is u (A)  u (C) given q = 1. This
can be rewritten, similarly to (24), as
 (t  b) + c  p  aLL (1) (1 + s) t; (25)
with p0
 
aLL (1)

= 1= ( (1 + s) t).
Full honesty may also be an option, if the auditing is cheap or payment for evasion
high. A general condition for the existence of full honesty euilibrium is u (A)  u (C)
given q = 0. This can be rewritten as
 (t  b)   c  0:
However, this equilibrium is globally stable only if
 (t  b)    1  2q0HL c  0: (26)
27
C - comparative statics results
By inverse function theorem
aHLq =
 
p0 1
0 q +    
q (1 + s) t
0
q
=      
q2 (1 + s) t
1
p00 (aHL)
; (27)
aLLq =
 
p0 1
0q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
(q2 + q (   )) (1 + s) t
0
q
= (28)
 


   
(q +    )2 (1 + s) t + (2q +    )
1  2 + 
(q2 + (   ) q)2 (1 + s) t

1
p00 (aLL)
:
(29)
and
aHLk =
 
p0 1
0 q +    
q (1 + s) t
0
q
=      
q2 (1 + s) t
1
p00 (aHL)
; (30)
aLLq =
 
p0 1
0q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
(q2 + q (   )) (1 + s) t
0
q
= (31)
 


   
(q +    )2 (1 + s) t + (2q +    )
1  2 + 
(q2 + (   ) q)2 (1 + s) t

1
p00 (aLL)
:
(32)
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